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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Michael Parkins appeals from the judgment entered upon his conditional guilty plea
to trafficking in methamphetamine, contending the district court erred in denying his
motions to suppress.

Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings
Based upon testimony presented at the preliminary hearing and the October 8, 2015
suppression hearing, and the “Watchguard” videotape from Lewiston Police Officer Brett
Dammon’s patrol vehicle, the district court made the following initial factual findings
relative to Parkins’s underlying conviction for trafficking in methamphetamine:
Officer Dammon, of the Lewiston Police Department, was traveling
on Thain Avenue when he observed a vehicle swerving within its lane of
travel. Tr. at 7 [Ls.12-22].[1] Dammon followed the car and observed the
car continue to swerve, driving onto the centerline, and exceeding the speed
limit by traveling 41 mph in a 35 mph zone. [Tr., p.8, Ls.9-17.] The vehicle
stopped [sic] also stopped in the middle of the crosswalk at a red light. Tr.
at 8 [Ls.19-21]. As a result of these observations, Dammon initiated a
traffic stop and identified the driver as Michael Parkins. Tr. at 8 [Ls.21-24].
When Officer Dammon contacted Parkins, he observed Parkins [sic]
behavior as very erratic, and that Parkins was reaching around in the vehicle
for no obvious reason. Tr. at 9 [L.23 – p.10, L.3]. Parkins was also acting
excited and energetic. [Tr., p.9, L.25 – p.10, L.3; p.31, Ls.2-3.] Parkins
was cooperative with Officer Dammon and he had provided documents as
they were requested. A few minutes later, Parkins began fumbling and
searching in his wallet even though he had already provided documents to
Officer Dammon. Tr. at 10 [Ls.5-7]. Officer Dammon testified that he
believed Parkins' behavior was consistent with that of an individual who is
under the influence of a stimulant drug, such as methamphetamine. Tr. at
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Citations to the transcript of the July 22, 2015 preliminary hearing will be prefaced with
“Tr.”
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I0 [Ls.10-16]. Dammon also recognized Parkins' name from past drug
investigations Dammon had been involved in.[2] Tr. at 10 [Ls.9-10].
After collecting the requested documents and identifying Parkins,
Dammon noticed an unopened bottle of alcoholic beverage sitting on the
floorboard of the vehicle. This observation, coupled with Parkins' driving
pattern and actions upon contact, led Dammon to decide to complete field
sobriety testing. Tr. at 10 [Ls.19-25]. Dammon requested a second officer
respond to the scene to provide cover while he conducted the field sobriety
tests. Tr. at 11 [Ls.4-9]. While Dammon was requesting a cover officer, he
noticed Parkins reaching around in the vehicle. [Tr., p.11, Ls.15-18.]
Concerned that Parkins may have a weapon in the vehicle, Dammon asked
Parkins to exit the vehicle and sit on the bumper. [Tr., p.11, Ls.18-21.]
Parkins complied with the request, but he sat on the ground behind his car
rather than sitting on the bumper as instructed. Tr. at 11 [Ls.18-21].
Dammon waited until the cover officer arrived before he initiated
field sobriety testing. Tr. at 11 [Ls.21-22]. Corporals Eylar and Campbell
arrived a few minutes later. [Tr., p.12, Ls.5-12.] At this point, Dammon
had detained Parkins for approximately nineteen minutes. (See Video
Exhibit B.)
(R., pp.144-146 (bracketed supplemental citations to record added).)
During their initial conversation, Parkins told Officer Dammon he had about $600
in cash in his wallet, and that he had not worked for the last year and one half, which made
the officer suspect Parkins was involved in the distribution of drugs. 3 (Dammon Video,
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For about five years, and until shortly before the preliminary hearing, Officer Dammon
was a narcotics detective with the Lewiston Police Department, and had attended the DEA
narcotics investigation course, a “midlevel narcotics investigations course,” and “multiple
other trainings in drug identification and drug investigations.” (Tr., p.6, Ls.13-24.)
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According to Exhibit B (Dammon Video, 12:40-13:12), Officer Dammon told Parkins:
And then I see your demeanor and your actions right now and how you’re
acting. And you obviously, and you haven’t had a job in a year and a half
and you have over 600 dollars in cash on you. Okay. What does that lead
me to believe that’s going on? “A,” I think you’re under the influence of
some type of drug, and “B,” potentially you’re involved in the distribution
of drugs. You got no other explanation on how you came up with 600
dollars in cash and you have no job.
2

Ex. B, 7:00-13:15.) Officer Dammon asked Corporal Campbell to contact K-9 Officer
Reese to come to the scene with his narcotics K-9, Marta. (Tr., p.12, Ls.11-20.) When
Officer Dammon asked Parkins to stand up so he could conduct field sobriety tests, he
noticed Parkins “had a large bulge in the groin – on his groin area[,]” like “having maybe
a softball down your pants or something like that.” (Tr., p.12, L.25 – p.13, L.9.) After the
officer asked Parkins about the bulge for officer safety reasons, Parkins “actually grabbed
his groin[,]” and the officer thought he “could hear, like a bag crinkle.” (Tr., p.13, Ls.1923.) Parkins said that his genitalia was swollen, and continually put his hands in his pocket.
(Tr., p.13, L.24 – p.14, L.3.) Officer Dammon did not know whether Parkins had a weapon
down his pants, so he had Parkins face the rear of his vehicle so he could conduct a ---Terry
pat-down on his person. (Tr., p.13, L.25 – p.14, L.6.) Officer Dammon explained:
Because of his behavior, he obviously didn't want me to touch that
area. He said he had previously had Gonorrhea and that’s why his genitals
were swollen.
But he kept his torso up against the side -- the side of the car so I
couldn’t pat that area. And I thought it was odd that if he was in pain
because of this, why he would force his torso up the car. But I was able to
have him lean back so I could check that area. It obviously wasn’t a
weapon, but I didn't believe it was his genitals. And I still believed there
was something down his pants.
(Tr., p.14, Ls.11-21.)
Officer Dammon’s pat-down of Parkins “confirmed that it more than likely wasn’t
a weapon in his groin area[.]” (Tr., p.14, L.25 – p.15, L.2.) Officer Dammon then had
Parkins perform three standard field sobriety tests, and Officer Eylar, “who [had] more
training and experience in impaired drivers, conducted two tests.” (Tr., p.15, Ls.7-9.)
After conferring with Officer Eylar, Officer Dammon “did not believe [Parkins] was too
impaired to be operating his motor vehicle.” (Tr., p.15, Ls.7-11.)
3

Officer Dammon testified that they “were just concluding the field sobriety tests
when Officer Reese arrived” with the drug dog. (Tr., p.16, Ls.5-7.) At that time, Officer
Dammon “began completing a traffic citation on Mr. Parkins” for speeding, and “during
the time [he] was completing the citation, Officer Reese contacted [him] and advised that
his K-9 had alerted for – for the odor of narcotics coming from within the vehicle.” (Tr.,
p.16, L.8 – p.17, L.24.) The district court explained the events following the drug dog’s
alert on Parkins’s vehicle:
Officers Reese and Dammon searched the interior of the car
following the alert and during the search a glass methamphetamine pipe was
located. Tr. at 18 [Ls.3-24]. Parkins was subsequently arrested for
possession of drug paraphernalia. [Tr., p.19, Ls.1-7.] Following the arrest,
Parkins was searched and a black nylon bag containing methamphetamine
was located on his person. Tr. at 19 [Ls.10-24].
(R., p.146.)
The state charged Parkins with trafficking in methamphetamine. (R., pp.77-79.)
Parkins, through counsel, filed a motion to suppress all evidence, claiming that, because he
was illegally detained, law enforcement lacked probable cause to conduct a warrantless
search of his vehicle and person. (R., p.88-90.) Parkins filed a brief in support of his
motion, which was appended with the Watchguard videos from Officers Dammon’s and
Campbell’s police vehicles, and a transcript of the preliminary hearing. (R., pp.91-133.)
The state filed a brief in opposition. (R., pp.134-142.) After hearing additional testimony
and argument, the district court entered an opinion and order denying Parkins’s motion to
suppress. (R., pp.143-150.) Parkins’s trial counsel filed a motion to withdraw (R., pp.157160), which was granted (R., pp.161-162).
After being appointed new counsel (R., p.165) (following the brief appointment of
a second counsel who withdrew due to a conflict (R., pp.163-165)), Parsons’s counsel
4

moved for time to file pretrial motions (R., pp.167-168), which was granted over the state’s
objection (R., pp.173-174, 176-178). Parkins filed a second Motion to Dismiss or Suppress
Evidence with an attached copy of the preliminary hearing transcript. (R., pp.179-207.)
After hearing argument, the district court entered an opinion and order denying Parkins’s
suppression motion.

(R., pp.208-214.)

The court ruled that “[t]he totality of the

circumstances gave rise to reasonable suspicion allowing Officer Dammon to permissibly
extend the stop because [it] was initiated based on a driving infraction and a possible DUI,
but then based on Parkins [sic] behavior and Officer Dammon’s observation the traffic
stop[] turned into the pursuit of a drug investigation.” (R., p. 212.) The court particularly
noted Officer Dammon’s observation of “the crinkle sound and the protection that Parkins
gave to his groin area[,]” which “gave rise to [his] suspicions that Parkins was potentially
concealing drugs.”

(Id.)

Two days later, the state filed an Amended Information

additionally charging Parkins with a persistent violator sentencing enhancement. (R.,
pp.216-217.)
The parties subsequently reached an agreement under which Parkins pleaded guilty
to trafficking in methamphetamine, the state dismissed the persistent violator charge, and
Parkins reserved the right to appeal the denial of his suppression motions; the state agreed
to recommend a unified seven-year sentence with three years fixed. (R., p.273; see
generally 7/18/16 Tr. (change of plea hearing).) The court imposed a unified ten-year
sentence with four years fixed. (R., pp.281-284.) Parkins filed a Rule 35 motion for
reduction of sentence, which was denied. (R., pp.285-288.) Parkins filed a timely notice
of appeal. (R., pp.289-293, 306-311.)

5

ISSUE
Parkins states the issue on appeal as:
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Parkins’s motions to suppress
because the traffic stop was unlawfully extended?
(Appellant’s Brief, p.10.)

The state wishes to rephrase the issue on appeal as follows:
Has Parkins failed to demonstrate any error in the district court’s factual findings
or in its conclusion that there was reasonable articulable suspicion to support Parkins’s
detention at the time the drug dog alerted on his vehicle?
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ARGUMENT
Parkins Has Failed To Show Error In The Denial Of His Motions To Suppress
A.

Introduction
Parkins contends the district court erred in denying his motions to suppress.

(Appellant’s Brief, pp.11-13.)

More specifically, Parkins argues that “his Fourth

Amendment rights were violated when the police officers continued to detain him for a
drug dog sniff after the purpose of the traffic stop was completed.” (Appellant’s Brief,
p.11.)

Application of the correct legal standards to the evidence presented at the

suppression hearing and the facts found by the district court supports the district court’s
conclusion that Parkins was not entitled to suppression of any evidence. Parkins has failed
to show otherwise.

B.

Standard Of Review
“The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a decision on

a motion to suppress is challenged, the appellate court accepts the trial court’s findings of
fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but freely reviews the application of
constitutional principles to those facts.” State v. Diaz, 144 Idaho 300, 302, 160 P.3d 739,
741 (2007). The power to assess the credibility of witnesses, resolve factual conflicts,
weigh evidence, and draw factual inferences is vested in the trial court. State v. ValdezMolina, 127 Idaho 102, 106, 897 P.2d 993, 997 (1995); State v. Fleenor, 133 Idaho 552,
555, 989 P.2d 784, 787 (Ct. App. 1999). The appellate court also gives deference to any
implicit findings of the trial court supported by substantial evidence. State v. Brauch, 133
Idaho 215, 218, 984 P.2d 703, 706 (1999).
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C.

Parkins Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court’s Denial Of His
Suppression Motion
A traffic stop is a seizure for purposes of the Fourth Amendment and, because it is

limited in scope and duration, “it is analogous to an investigative detention and is analyzed
under the principles set forth” in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). State v. Ramirez, 145
Idaho 886, 889, 187 P.3d 1261, 1264 (Ct. App. 2008) (citations omitted). “[T]raffic stops
must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the
stop.” State v. Henage, 143 Idaho 655, 658, 152 P.3d 16, 19 (2007) (citation and quotations
omitted); see
also Rodriguez
States,
- --- - - - - - v.
- -United
----- - - 135 S.Ct. 1609, 1612 (2015) (“We hold that
a police stop exceeding the time limit needed to handle the matter for which the stop was
made violates the Constitution’s shield against unreasonable seizures.”). “There is no rigid
time limit for determining when a detention has lasted longer than necessary; rather, a court
must consider the scope of the detention and the law enforcement purposes to be served,
as well as the duration of the stop.” State v. Grantham, 146 Idaho 490, 496, 198 P.3d 128,
134 (Ct. App. 2008) (citations omitted). The court must also consider whether the officer’s
observations during the encounter “and events succeeding the stop” gave rise to “legitimate
reasons for particularized lines of inquiry and further investigation” which justified
expanding the investigation to other possible crimes. -Id.;
see --also State
- --- - -v.
- -Brumfield,
- - - - - - 136
Idaho 913, 916, 42 P.3d 706, 709 (Ct. App. 2001).
It is well-settled that law enforcement may deploy a drug dog to sniff the exterior
of a lawfully stopped vehicle without suspicion of drug activity so long as doing so does
not prolong the detention beyond what is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop.
Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405 (2005); State v. Wigginton, 142 Idaho 180, 183-84, 125
P.3d 536, 539-40 (Ct. App. 2005); State v. Parkinson, 135 Idaho 357, 363, 17 P.3d 301,
8

307 (Ct. App. 2000). Moreover, a canine sniff may be performed during a traffic stop
without violating the Fourth Amendment if the duration of the stop is not extended or if
any extension of the stop is justified by reasonable suspicion. State v. Kelley, 159 Idaho
417, 424, 361 P.3d 1280, 1287 (Ct. App. 2015).
After citing the applicable legal standards (R., pp.210-212), the district court
rejected Parkins’s argument that Officer Dammon unlawfully prolonged his detention
without reasonable suspicion, finding:
“A drug dog sniff may be performed during a traffic stop without violating
the Fourth Amendment if the duration of the stop is not extended or if any
extension of the stop is justified by reasonable suspicion.” [State v. Kelley,
159 Idaho 417, 361 P.3d 1280, 1287 (Ct. App. 2015).]
The Defendant asserts the charge should be dismissed or the
evidence obtained in the search of the vehicle and the Defendant's person
suppressed since the officers initiated the drug dog sniff without a
reasonable articulable suspicion. There was reasonable suspicion for a dog
sniff based on the information gathered by Officer Dammon that brought
his attention to the “bulge” that Parkins was trying to conceal during the
Terry pat for weapons before conducting the field sobriety tests. Although,
[sic] Parkins claimed at the time that he had Gonorrhea and was protecting
his groin, he still leaned up against the vehicle protecting his groin area
contradicting the reasoning of why he did not want the officer to pat that
area or protecting that area by putting his hands in his pockets.
The totality of the circumstances gave rise to reasonable suspicion
allowing Officer Dammon to permissibly extend the stop because the traffic
stop was initiated based on a driving infraction and a possible DUI, but then
based on Parkins [sic] behavior and Officer Dammon's observations the
traffic stopped [sic] turned into the pursuit of a drug investigation. Officer
Dammon's observations stemmed from the crinkle sound and the protection
that Parkins gave to his groin area. This gave rise to Officer Dammon [sic]
suspicions that Parkins was potentially concealing drugs. In the case at
hand, the drug dog's alert on the exterior of the vehicle established probable
cause for the warrantless search of the interior. The drug paraphernalia was
found during the search and Parkins was lawfully arrested. Therefore, the
motion to suppress evidence is denied.
(R., pp.212-213.)
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Parkins “acknowledges that Rodriguez held that a traffic stop may be prolonged if
there is reasonable suspicion to justify a continued detention.” (Appellant’s Brief, p.13.)
However, Parkins focuses solely on the original basis for the traffic stop, arguing, “Officer
Dammon unlawfully prolonged the traffic stop for the dog sniff because the purpose of the
stop was over when he successfully completed the field sobriety tests. At that point, Officer
Dammon’s suspicion that Mr. Parkins was driving under the influence of drugs or alcohol
was dispelled.” (Id.) Accordingly, Parkins concludes that “extending the stop to conduct
the dog sniff violated [his] Fourth Amendment rights.” (Id.) Parkins’s argument fails for
two reasons.
First, although Officer Dammon’s suspicion that Parkins was driving under the
influence may have been dispelled by his performance on the field sobriety tests, based on
the totality of information known by the officer prior to those tests, he had a new suspicion
that Parkins was hiding illegal drugs in his pants, and/or was distributing drugs. As the
district court explained, Officer Dammon testified that he saw Parkins trying to conceal “a
large bulge in [his] pants, which crinkled during the weapon pat down” “before conducting
the field sobriety tests.” (R., pp.210, 212 (emphasis added).) The court noted that Parkins’s
claim that he did not want his groin area patted by the officer because it caused him pain
(due to Gonorrhea) was contradicted by his conduct when he “leaned up against the vehicle
protecting his groin area,” and when he tried to “protect[] that area by putting his hands in
his pockets.” (R., p.212.) Additionally, as a trained narcotics officer, Officer Dammon
reasonably suspected that the $600 cash that Parkins had in his wallet – after not working
for a year and a half – raised the possibility that Parkins was selling drugs. (See
- - Dammon
Video, Ex. B, 7:00-13:12.)
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Based on the above-described factors, the totality of the circumstances gave rise to
a reasonable suspicion that Parkins was concealing drugs on his person and possibly
engaging in the distribution of drugs. To be clear, Officer Dammon initially had a
reasonable suspicion to conduct a traffic stop of Parkins’s vehicle because Parkins was
speeding and swerving within his lane. Next, based on Parkins’s demeanor and behavior
during the traffic stop, Officer Dammon formed a reasonable suspicion he was under the
influence of drugs.

Before that suspicion was dissolved by Parkins’s successful

performance of the field sobriety tests, Parkins engaged in conduct that gave the officer
reasonable suspicion he was concealing drugs in his groin area and/or distributing drugs.
In short, there was never a moment, relevant to this case, that Officer Dammon did not
have a reasonable suspicion allowing him to detain Parkins under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S.
1 (1968). Parkins has failed to show any error in the district court’s decision denying his
motion to suppress.
Second, even assuming, arguendo, that Officer Dammon did not have reasonable
grounds to suspect Parkins of concealing or distributing drugs, the K-9 sniff occurred
before the initial purpose of the traffic stop expired – the speeding violation. As Officer
Dammon testified, they “were just concluding the field sobriety tests when Officer Reese
arrived” with the drug dog. (Tr., p.16, Ls.5-7.) At that time, Officer Dammon “began
completing a traffic citation on Mr. Parkins” for speeding, and “during the time [he] was
completing the citation, Officer Reese contacted [him] and advised that his K-9 had alerted
for – for the odor of narcotics coming from within the vehicle.” (Tr., p.16, L.8 – p.17, L.24
(emphasis added).) Therefore, the K-9 drug sniff and alert – which established probable
cause to search Parkins’s vehicle under the automobile exception – occurred within the
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period of time that was “necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop.” Henage, 143
Idaho at 658, 152 P.3d at 19; see Kelley, 159 Idaho at 424, 361 P.3d at 1287; Carroll v.
United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925) (automobile exception); State v. Buti, 131 Idaho 793,
800, 964 P.2d 660, 667 (1998) (“The automobile exception allows police officers to
conduct warrantless searches of automobiles if they have probable cause to believe that the
automobile contains contraband or evidence of a crime.”).
Because the drug dog alert on Parkins's vehicle occurred within the time Officer
Dammon reasonably had for effectuating the purpose of the traffic stop (i.e., writing the
speeding citation), under either free review of the application of constitutional principles
to the facts of this case, see Diaz, 144 Idaho at 302, 160 P.3d at 741, or as an alternative
ground for affirming the district court’s ruling, see State v. Morris, 119 Idaho 448, 450,
807 P.2d 1286, 1288 (Ct. App. 1991), Parkins has failed to demonstrate any error in the
district court’s denial of his suppression motions.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the judgment of conviction
entered upon Parkins’s conditional guilty plea to trafficking in methamphetamine
DATED this 6th day of February, 2016.

/s/ John C. McKinney_______________
JOHN C. McKINNEY
Deputy Attorney General
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 6th day of February, 2018, served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by emailing an electronic copy
to:
REED P. ANDERSON
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
at the following email address: briefs@sapd.state.id.us.

/s/ John C. McKinney_________________
JOHN C. McKINNEY
Deputy Attorney General
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